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1. Overview 
Over the past 10 years, there have been numerous meta-studies and syntheses of the impact 
and effectiveness of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs), many of which attempt to 
incrementally add value to the existing evidence base or offer new perspectives on existing 
conclusions. These studies are almost unanimous in their conclusion that little of practical or 
replicable value is known, much less in fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
Much of the literature on TAIs focuses on the effectiveness of implementation, rather than on 
their broader impact. There are few comparative studies that look across various cases and 
which allow for general conclusions to be extrapolated. Furthermore, most TAIs are based on 
rather optimistic assumptions about what they are able to achieve, rather than on well-developed 
theories of change, and few studies pay sufficient attention to context, which is crucial for 
understanding how such initiatives play out in fragile and conflict-affected settings. 
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Nevertheless, there have been some recent efforts to make sense of the contextual factors which 
favour or hinder successful TAIs and which are the focus of this helpdesk report. The few studies 
which address fragile and conflict-affected settings specifically (Grandvoinnet et al 2015; Fooks 
2013; Schouten 2011) are given special attention. 
Successful implementation of TAIs is increasingly understood to depend on the interaction of 
“micro” local-level factors with a number of “macro” contextual dimensions, including the capacity 
of civil society, the will of political society, inter-elite relations, state-society relations, intra-society 
relations and global dimensions. More specifically, these “macro” factors include: 
▪ The level of democratization or space for accountability demands to be made  
▪ The broader political economy, including incentives and sanctions for public officials  
▪ The degree of ‘political will’ for accountability.  
▪ The persistence of mobilisation over time  
▪ The extent to which TAIs are vertically integrated  
▪ The quality and strength of pro-accountability networks across state and society.  
▪ The capacity of citizens and civil society organizations to mobilize for greater 
accountability  
▪ The degree of authority and credibility of lead agencies in TAIs 
▪ The extent to which the issues TAIs seek to address are perceived as relevant and 
actionable  
An appreciation of these contextual dimensions suggests that TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings need to focus on strengthening the social contract between state and society. In theory, 
such an approach can contribute to greater state legitimacy, strengthen citizen´s understanding 
of citizenship, promote political inclusion, provide interfaces between citizens and governments, 
build intra-community trust, and build competencies and skills that are necessary for organizing 
collective action.  
In order to realise this potential, it has been suggested that TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings need to pay particular attention to: 
▪ Clarity of outcomes: There is an increasing appreciation of the need to better articulate 
and unpack what TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings aim to achieve, and how 
different outcomes are expected to interact. For example, emerging evidence suggests 
that the process through which services are delivered may be at least as important as, if 
not more important than, service outcomes in building state legitimacy. 
▪ The role of intermediaries: Effective intermediaries need to be able to forge shared 
agendas, develop social bonds across identity groups, and reinforce a sense of 
citizenship. Identification of appropriate intermediaries requires a careful examination of 
existing social networks.  
▪ Inclusion of local elites: While elites may capture the gains from TAIs to further their 
own interests, under the right conditions they can also use them for the greater benefit of 
the community. There is therefore a need to work with local elites in a way which 
supports them to include the poor. 
▪ The power of information and informal networks: TAIs should focus on building 
inclusive information flows that reach all groups within society and avoid the perception of 
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favouritism to particular groups. Equally important is to recognise the role of informal 
networks and relationships in how information is shaped.  
▪ Balancing incentives and sanctions: TAIs need to carefully consider the relative 
weight given to sanctions and the trade-offs between forward and backward-looking 
accountability efforts. 
▪ Supporting grievance mechanisms: recent evidence suggests that the mere presence 
of grievance mechanisms, even when not actively used, can help to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens. 
In order to strengthen the evidence based on the contextual factors which influence the impact 
and effectiveness of TAIs, a number of areas for future of research have been suggested 
including: 
▪ Applying new research methods to better understand non-linear change and complexity  
▪ Conducting more comparative research across contexts and initiatives  
▪ Exploring incentives for collective action on transparency and accountability with an 
explicit focus on power and politics 
▪ Understanding better how to build cross-cutting accountability coalitions  
▪ Understanding global-local linkages and the roles of a more diverse set of non-state 
actors, including the private sector and aid donors  
▪ Understanding the role of new technologies for political action. 
2. Snapshot of evidence on TAIs1 generally 
Evidence base 
Evidence to assess the effectiveness and impact of TAIs is generated through a range of 
research approaches including qualitative case studies, randomised controlled trials (RCTs), ex-
post quantitative/qualitative evaluations, and participatory evaluations, with each approach 
having advantages and disadvantages. For example, participatory evaluations are often critiqued 
for bias in reporting successes, RCTs while statistically sound, can overlook the question of 
causality, and case studies are often criticised for being more descriptive than analytical (Joshi 
2013). 
Much of the literature on TAIs focuses on the effectiveness of implementation of initiatives, rather 
than their broader impact. Effectiveness is understood to mean the extent to which initiatives are 
effective in achieving stated goals, whereas impact refers to the degree to which initiatives 
contribute to longer term, ‘second-order’ goals (McGee and Gaventa 2010). Those studies which 
do explicitly assess impact tend to focus on single cases. There are few comparative studies that 
look across various cases to discuss the degree of effective implementation and explain it, or that 
allow for general conclusions to be extrapolated. Positive evidence in one setting is often not 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this helpdesk research report, the terms transparency and accountability Interventions 
(TAIs) and social accountability (SA) interventions are used interchangeably. Within these categories, specific 
interventions may include: complaints mechanisms, public information/ transparency campaigns, citizen report 
cards and score cards, community monitoring and social audits, participatory budgeting, public expenditure 
monitoring, participatory auditing, right to know campaigns, strengthening the media, new legislative frameworks 
and voluntary disclosure mechanisms, revenue transparency, aid transparency (McGee and Gaventa 2010). 
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corroborated – and sometimes even contradicted - by findings in another setting, even where 
similar methods have been used (McGee and Gaventa 2010; O´Meally 2013). 
Furthermore, most TAIs are based on rather optimistic assumptions about what they are able to 
achieve, rather than on well-developed theories of change which offer plausible explanations for 
how the desired changes are likely to occur. Purported impacts include: improvements in the 
quality of governance, increased development effectiveness, empowerment of disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups, greater openness and access to information (sometimes regarded as an 
end in itself), and greater accountability to citizens (McGee and Gaventa 2010; Joshi 2013). Yet 
the sequence of steps necessary for TAIs to be successful, their durability, and their interaction 
with other factors, are frequently poorly understood (McGee and Gaventa 2010; Joshi 2013). 
For example, growing evidence exists that transparency only leads to greater accountability in 
interaction with other factors. As noted by McGee and Gaventa (2010), “transparency initiatives 
which ‘mobilise the power of shame’ have no purchase on the shameless”. Another common 
assumption is that making information available will stimulate action on the part of a broad range 
of stakeholders, when in fact little may be known about the incentives and constraints of 
collective action to use this information. And finally, many assumptions often assume 
homogeneous categories of actors, such as ‘states’, ‘citizens’, ‘media’, ‘civil society’, without 
looking at critical differences of position, power, behaviours and incentives within them (McGee 
and Gaventa 2010). 
Crucially for the case of fragile and conflict-affected settings, few studies pay much attention to 
context (Bukenya et al 2012). Indeed, it is particularly difficult to disentangle the “context” from 
the “intervention” and almost impossible to exhaustively consider the enormous range of 
potential contextual variations that one might face on an everyday basis (O´Meally 2013). In 
many cases, accountability initiatives are part of a larger package of strategies that citizen 
groups use to gain better services, making the task of isolating the impact of TAIs even more 
difficult (Joshi 2013). 
Notwithstanding these challenges, some useful approaches are currently being promoted to 
assess the effectiveness and impact of TAIs, most notably ‘theory-based’ approaches which use 
both quantitative and in-depth qualitative methods to evaluate outcomes within an over-arching 
political economy analysis (Bukenya et al 2012; McGee and Gaventa 2010). The final section of 
this report offers some suggestions for promising areas for future research in this area. 
Evidence of impact 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that TAIs are more successful in terms of effectiveness 
- in that they are often well implemented and reach first order goals such as the use of complaint 
mechanisms or the exposure of corruption - than in terms of impact, such as improving 
responsiveness of providers or of services themselves. Initiatives targeted at exposing corruption 
have been fairly successful, whereas interventions intended to improve service outcomes and 
responsiveness have not always had the intended impacts.  In particular, there is some evidence 
that complaints channels for service users may be successful, particularly for women. Impact is 
also more likely through forms of collective action rather than individual action. In particular, 
collective accountability is more likely to result in reduced corruption and increased 
empowerment of citizens (Joshi 2013). 
5 
Emerging research also suggests that participation of citizen groups in policy formation 
processes ‘upstream’, will increase the likelihood of their engagement TAIs ‘downstream’ (Joshi 
2013), with the most tangible development impacts being witnessed in the areas of education, 
participatory budgeting and water management, in countries with at least nominally responsive 
elected governments (Fox 2014). 
Interventions which manage to catalyse collaboration between state and non-state actors, who 
are deemed credible and legitimate, and which manage to generate and disseminate high-quality 
and salient forms of information, are particularly associated with success in terms of improved 
governance and increased levels of citizen empowerment (Bukenya et al 2012). Exclusively 
demand-side TAIs - what Fox (2014) describes as “tactical” approaches - tend to have less 
impact than “strategic” approaches. The latter combine information access with support for 
enabling environments for collective action that can scale up and coordinate with 
governmental reforms to encourage public sector responsiveness to citizen demands (Fox 2014). 
Thus, it is argued, “strategies of mutually empowering coalitions of pro-accountability actors in 
both state and society can trigger the virtuous circles of mutual empowerment that are needed to 
break out of ‘low-accountability traps´” (Fox 2014). 
3. Factors which enable or constrain TAI effectiveness  
Despite the limits of the evidence, and while recognising the challenges inherent in transposing 
lessons across different settings, there have been some recent attempts to tease out the 
contextual factors which influence the impact of TAIs. In a broad sense, these involve an 
appreciation of transparency and accountability as more than formal mechanisms or instruments, 
but also as relationships involving power dynamics across state and society, and as patterns of 
attitudes and behaviours (McGee and Gaventa 2010). These supply and demand side conditions 
include:   
▪ The level of democratization and the presence of civic space for accountability 
demands to be made (McGee and Gaventa 2010) 
▪ The broader political economy, including enabling legal frameworks, incentives and 
sanctions which affect the behaviours of public officials (McGee and Gaventa 2010; Fox 
2014), and the nature of the political settlement and inter-elite relations. This includes 
capacity for positive institutional responses, e.g. responding to citizen recommendations, 
investigating complaints and grievances, conducting inspections and audits, and 
changing public sector incentive structures to discourage abuse (Fox 2014; Joshi 2013).   
▪ The degree of ‘political will’ for accountability. In particular, the extent to which TAIs 
build on domestic pressures for change, support the capacity of the state to respond to 
voice, and influence service provider incentives is seen as key (McGee and Gaventa 
2010; Joshi 2013; Fox 2014; O´Meally 2013), as is the need to balance the tension 
between demanding accountability and engaging with providers to understand the 
constraints they face. Often successful initiatives have constructive engagement and 
dialogue between providers and users about potential reforms as part of the process of 
demanding accountability (Joshi 2013). 
▪ The persistence of mobilisation over time also contributes to effective influence, 
suggesting it may be important to consider social accountability as the outcome of 
longer-term and iterative processes of bargaining between social and state actors, rather 
than one-off interventions (Joshi & Houtzager, 2012).  
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▪ The extent to which TAIs, and civil society action more generally, are vertically 
integrated (Fox 2014; Bukenya et al 2012). This includes the degree to which 
accountability, transparency and participation initiatives are embedded throughout all 
stages of the policy cycle, from how decisions are made to whether and how they are 
implemented (McGee and Gaventa 2010). Obstacles to successful TAIs are often 
dependent on the interplay between vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability 
relationships. For example, in many contexts, service delivery is highly politicised and 
public oversight agencies and access to social programmes are controlled by political 
leaders, leading to “vicious circles of self-reproducing low-accountability traps” at both 
national and sub-national levels (Fox 2014).  
▪ The quality and strength of pro-accountability networks across state and society. It 
is often these networks which account for success rather than the characteristics of 
individual actors (O´Meally 2013). According to one meta-analysis of TAIs, more than a 
third of studies reviewed found that higher levels of state-civil society collaboration within 
accountability mechanisms translated into greater success (Hickey and King 2016). Even 
within contentious actions, which might be expected to involve adversarial relationships 
between the state and citizens, receptivity to civil society advocacy among political actors 
and effective interfaces for engagement were important to success (Hickey and King 
2016). Alliances between interest groups afford the legitimacy necessary to get the 
attention of decision-makers, while alliances with elite political and legal networks have 
assisted communities to use legal challenge and constitutional frameworks (Bukenya et 
al 2012). 
▪ The capacity of citizens and civil society organizations to access and use 
information, to mobilize for greater accountability (McGee and Gaventa 2010), and to 
scale up representation of citizen voice, including mass membership organisations (Fox 
2014). An active and independent media also seems to be a critical part of several of the 
successful cases (Joshi 2013).  
▪ The degree of authority and credibility of lead agencies in TAIs, their ability to 
mobilise support spanning the state-society divide, and their employment of a wide range 
of strategies (Bukenya et al 2012; Hickey and King 2016). One meta-study reports that 
more than a third of studies reviewed found the credibility of lead actors to be critical to 
success and this was particularly significant within transparency initiatives and 
contentious actions (Hickey and King 2016).  
▪ The extent to which information disseminated through TAIs, and the problems and 
issues TAIs seek to address, are perceived as relevant and actionable by 
stakeholders (Fox 2014; O´Meally 2013). Vital resources such as education, livelihoods, 
access to land and access to life-saving medicines catalyse strong reactions from 
citizens (Hickey and King 2016). This suggests that there might be a stronger ‘social 
contract’ around some issues and public goods than others, in the sense that actors on 
both sides of the equation perceive that there is a duty for public authorities to respond 
(Bukenya et al 2012; Hickey and King 2016). 
In view of these findings, researchers have begun to elaborate a set of broader conceptual 
framings through which to analyse the contextual factors which have an impact on TAIs. 
Bukenya et al (2012) identify four institutional spheres which are critical to understanding the 
contextual factors which influence TAI implementation:  
▪ Political society: The character of political society is critical to the success of social 
accountability interventions, particularly state functionaries (e.g. elected officials willing to 
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hold bureaucrats to account) and the role played by formal and informal political 
institutions (e.g. political parties, patronage).  
▪ Civil society: The capacity and commitment to promoting social accountability within civil 
society is also critical, not only in terms of placing demands on the state, but more 
importantly in the sense of building progressive coalitions both within civil society and 
between civil and political society.  
▪ Inequality and exclusion: The capacity of citizens to engage in social accountability 
initiatives and to hold public officials to account are closely shaped by power relations, 
involving inequality and exclusion along multiple lines (e.g. education, class, ethnicity, 
caste).  
▪ State-society relations: The capacity and commitment to deliver accountable forms of 
governance is ultimately dependent on the character of state-society relations. This can 
be conceptualized in terms of the presence and character of a ‘social contract’ around 
specific public goods, which can be strengthened over time through state-society 
bargaining. 
In a similar vein, O´Meally (2013) presents a schematic summary of the key contextual domains 
and sub-dimensions that influence TAIs: 
 
Contextual 
domains 
Key domain sub-dimensions 
Civil Society Technical and organizational capacity 
Capacity to build alliances across society  
Capacity to build alliances/networks with the state 
Authority, legitimacy, and credibility of civil society with citizens and state 
actors 
Willingness of civil society to challenge accountability status quo 
Capacity of citizens to engage in social accountability 
Willingness of citizens to engage in social accountability 
Political Society Willingness of political elites to respond to and foster social accountability 
Willingness of state bureaucrats to respond to and foster social 
accountability 
State and political elite capacity to respond to social accountability 
Democratization and the civil society enabling environment 
The nature of the rule of law 
The capacity and willingness of political parties to support social 
8 
accountability 
Inter-Elite 
Relations 
The developmental nature of the political settlement 
The inclusiveness of the political settlement 
The organizational and political capabilities of the political settlement 
Elite ideas/norms of accountability underpinning the political settlement 
State-Society 
Relations 
The character and form of the social contract 
History of state–citizen bargaining (long- and short-term) 
State-society accountability and bridging mechanisms (formal and 
informal) 
The nature and depth of state-society pro-accountability networks 
Intra-Society 
Relations 
Inequality 
Social exclusion and fragmentation 
Global Dimensions Donor-state relations 
International power-holder accountability 
International political and economic drivers 
Source: O´Meally 2013 
Joshi (2014) complements these “macro” contextual factors with a set of “micro” or local factors 
that influence the extent to which social accountability initiatives are successful, even within 
otherwise broadly similar national contexts. These characteristics, which can then be analyzed in 
the context of specific interactions in specific situations, include: 
• Information:  Literacy/access; legitimacy/credibility of information  
• Citizen action: Priorities; belief in efficacy of channel; sense of entitlements  
• Official response: Public officials think citizens have legitimate grievances; public officials 
have capacity; public officials are motivated by public service; public officials care about 
their reputation; public officials have channels by which to influence higher levels. 
Taken together these different perspectives offer a comprehensive set of contextual variables 
found to influence the impact of social accountability mechanisms. The following section 
discusses the implications of such contextual factors for TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings. 
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4. Implications for fragile and conflict-affected settings  
Fragile and conflict-affected settings are characterised by social fragmentation, low levels of 
trust, and weak state capacity and/or legitimacy (Schouten 2011). They also often suffer from the 
simmering threat of violent conflict, and the actions and opportunities for engagement of the most 
vulnerable and marginalised are heavily influenced by fear and trauma. The state often lacks the 
ability to build inclusive political settlements and mediate relations across various groups 
(Grandvoinnet et al 2015), and it is not uncommon to find that informal networks and sources of 
information take precedence over formal ones. Civil society may lack leadership and have limited 
access to information or means of communication. Under these circumstances, mobilising 
citizens or engaging them in formal accountability mechanisms may be risky, and can be viewed 
as a challenge to the state (Schouten, 2011).  
Challenges and risks associated with TAIs in fragile and conflict-
affected settings 
McGee and Kroesschell (2013) identify the key factors which pose a challenge to external efforts 
to support accountability in fragile and conflict-affected settings, namely: the lack of local state–
citizen interfaces at which constructive citizen engagement can occur, the operations of invisible 
power in ostensibly participatory spaces, deficient legislative frameworks, elite capture, political 
and administrative cultures that are not conducive to citizen engagement, the challenges of 
promoting accountability in sovereign states as foreign aid donors, and the difficulty of including 
the most marginalised. When considering these challenges, it is important to recognise the 
distinction between states characterised by very little authority or capacity and those that are 
authoritarian and experiencing ongoing conflict. This distinction will have important implications 
for which interventions are more likely to bear fruit and how they are designed. For example, in 
the latter case, the challenge of ongoing conflict and social fragmentation is often a critical factor 
which makes any steps towards accountability particularly problematic (Joshi, email 
communication 3 April 2017). 
Another common feature of fragile and conflict-affected settings is that the social contract is in 
flux. The social contract refers to the agreement of citizens to submit to the authority of 
government in exchange for protection of their rights and access to services, security, and justice 
(Fooks 2013). But because of lingering unaddressed grievances, state-society relations and the 
social contract in fragile and conflict-affected settings often mean different things to different 
groups and their conception and expectations of it will depend on how they perceive historical 
relations. In short, while certain groups of citizens may consider the state to be illegitimate and 
predatory, others may believe that it represents their interests (Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
Unintended consequences 
The weaknesses of the social contract means that TAIs, if not approached sensitively, may 
cause a range of unintended negative consequences in fragile and conflict-affected settings. For 
example, if the process and impact of TAIs are perceived to exclude one or more groups, this 
can create or revive tensions within groups or between certain groups and the state. 
Interventions aimed at supporting certain actors and institutional reforms may also inadvertently 
lead to an overly powerful state and close off the space for citizen engagement (Granvionnet et 
al 2015). Furthermore, organisations participating in TAIs may be co-opted by the state or viewed 
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as agents of external forces. These risks are exacerbated where there are limited means for 
citizen protection and voice, high factionalism and weak security (Schouten 2011). 
In many fragile and conflict-affected settings, externally promoted accountability carries inherent 
risks for local staff and CSOs, and citizen voice can be constrained by the fear factor (Fox 2014), 
as well as by the trauma resulting from violent conflict. Many TAIs are based on the - often 
unfounded - assumption that participation has more benefits than costs, and that those targeted 
also perceive this to be the case, ignoring any fears of reprisals (Fox 2014; McGee and 
Kroesschell 2013). Yet local staff may be reluctant to work on accountability at too deep a level 
for fear of upsetting relationships with local government officials, and they may be dependent on 
elites for their project outcomes and therefore reluctant to risk alienating them. Challenging 
power relations between citizens and the state is a difficult and sensitive issue, especially when 
aid agency staff are dependent on good relations with local government officials. The delicate 
nature of aid relationships in unaccountable states may make the overt promotion of state or 
government accountability untenable or risk igniting conflicts (McGee and Kroesschell 2013). 
When this is the case, agencies may be forced to limit themselves to promoting transparency 
and ‘soft’ accountability measures, rather than ´hard´ enforceability aspects (McGee and 
Kroesschell 2013).  
The challenge of state capacity 
Political actors in fragile and conflict-affected settings are often weak and incapable of fulfilling 
their roles. In some cases, patronage networks may have effectively supplanted politicians, while 
the state may not have full or exclusive authority over its territory and is competing with other 
groups for legitimacy. Such conditions create a challenging context for TAIs, as they make 
identification of state responsibilities unclear, and capacity to respond to citizen demands 
inadequate (Grandvoinnet et al 2015).  
Such conditions are also not conducive to an environment in which enforcement or sanctions, 
which are critical to exacting accountability, can be effective. In systems with weak state 
structures, the space for the imposition of sanctions is under constant negotiation. Enforcement 
and answerability is likely to be interpreted and acted on differently in each social accountability 
relationship (Grandvoinnet et al 2015), leading to inconsistent application of sanctions, which can 
itself further fuel grievances. 
A further consequence of weak state capacity which has important implications for TAIs is limited 
accessibility to accurate and unbiased information, either because the infrastructure needed to 
disseminate information is lacking or limited to certain areas and groups, or because vertical 
flows of information are biased and hierarchical, reflecting a one-sided interpretation of history. In 
such circumstances, citizens may be unable to see beyond the confines of their own identity 
groups or to appreciate different perspectives. This phenomenon raises issues of trust, where 
citizens are wary of information sources that do not conform to their views, or are not deemed 
credible (Grandvoinnet et al 2015). Furthermore, a common phenomenon in states with weak 
administrative capacity is that data collection and management is inconsistent across different 
departments and localities, which makes it challenging to accurately assess effectiveness of 
government services (Schouten 2011). 
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The challenge of civil society capacity 
Fragile and conflict-affected settings are also often lacking in capable CSOs that can support 
TAIs and facilitate collective action. Fear, insecurity, repression, displacement, and violence may 
result in feelings of powerlessness, marginalization, and humiliation among citizens undermining 
the requirements for citizen engagement, namely a sense of citizenship, aspiration, the will and 
capacity to interact, and the experience and skills to use voice. Where strong social relationships 
do exist, they are likely to be concentrated within specific ethnic, religious or other identity 
groups, rather than across groups. As a result, even where it does exist, there is less chance that 
citizen participation will be meaningful, and existing inequalities and exclusion risk being 
perpetuated. In many fragile and conflict-affected settings, patterns of exclusion are deliberate, 
based on historical legacies and embedded in organizations. In many cases, citizens have 
internalized their own status as “marginalized.” Thus cultural norms that limit the opportunities for 
citizens to participate in civic affairs may also play a role, compounded by a lack of trust 
(Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
The challenge of state-society relations 
CSOs in fragile and conflict-affected settings may become stuck in a confrontational stance vis-à-
vis the state, due to a history of antagonistic relations. At the same time, the state may be 
distrustful of certain groups of CSOs (e.g. CSOs that receive foreign funding), perceiving them as 
challenging its authority and constraining its ability to perform its functions. The government may 
fear that opening up civil society space may incentivize citizens to lodge contentious action 
toward the state, which can threaten the very foundations of the state, especially where political 
settlements are fragile. In such contexts, the interfaces at the local level to allow constructive 
citizen engagement with the state are often missing or their legitimacy contested across groups. 
They may, in fact, be systematically biased in favour of certain groups and inaccessible to some 
(Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
The challenge of multiple and fragmented accountability relationships 
In fragile and conflict-affected settings, there are often multiple and fragmented sources of 
authority, including armed groups, faith leaders and/or traditional authorities. As a result, 
accountability relationships are not simply between states and citizens, but also between citizens 
and informal power-holders, and between informal power-holders and the state. The challenge 
for external interventions is to simultaneously strengthen accountability between these other 
actors and citizens in the short run, especially in places where they are providing services and 
raising revenues and the formal state has little presence, whilst working towards establishing 
accountability between citizens and the formal state in the long run (Joshi, email communication, 
3 April 2017). 
Addressing the challenges for TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings 
In the face of such challenges, it is important to assess the trade-offs between the importance of 
citizen engagement and the high risks that TAIs will fail given “macro” contextual constraints. 
TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings need to be adapted and adjusted constantly to the 
complex and fluid local environment. In this sense, it has been suggested that a “problem-driven 
iteration adaptation” approach might be a suitable design principle for such initiatives (Woolcock 
2014). Moreover, TAIs may need to take a more opportunistic approach of responding to 
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“windows of opportunity”, starting small and proceeding gradually and iteratively, given the 
instability within political society, civil society, and state-society relations. (Grandvoinnet et al 
2015).  
Some experts argue that strengthening citizen-state engagement in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings requires a triangulated approach that simultaneously builds voice and “listening capacity” 
within the media, government and civil society (von Kaltenborn-Stachau, 2008). In addition, 
recent experience suggests that focussing on strengthening the social contract and emphasising 
the role of all parties and their collective responsibility for problem-solving can be constructive in 
improving accountability in such contexts (Fooks, 2013). Developing a social contract in a fragile 
context requires ongoing explicit and implicit negotiation between different interest groups and a 
range of formal and informal powerholders, subject to renegotiation and changes in 
circumstances. This can help prevent a negative backlash from a state with authoritarian 
tendencies which may be nervous about the role of civil society, and give each party a realistic 
expectation of what the other can do (Fooks 2013).  
In theory, TAIs can support the social contract between state and citizens in a number of ways, 
including by: 
▪ by encouraging dialogue and engagement between the state and society at various 
levels, thus contributing to greater state legitimacy 
▪ strengthening citizen´s understanding of citizenship and the norms of inclusion 
▪ promoting political inclusion, thereby reducing perceptions of injustice and strengthening 
state legitimacy 
▪ providing interfaces between citizens and governments, where state officials can account 
for themselves 
▪ building intra-community trust and enabling collective action 
▪ building competencies and skills that are necessary for organizing collective action  
(Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
However, in order for this potential to be realised, the following factors are considered key: 
Clarity of outcomes 
There is an increasing appreciation of the need to better articulate and unpack what TAIs in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings aim to achieve, and how (e.g. service delivery 
improvements, reduction in levels of corruption, more responsive public officials, greater intra-
community and state-society trust). Whilst these outcomes are often intertwined, a better 
understanding of which outcomes are most important in such settings is critical. For example, the 
recent evidence on service delivery and state-building in fragile and conflict-affected settings, 
suggests – contrary to perceived wisdom – that effective service delivery does not necessarily 
contribute to state legitimacy in newly formed states. Instead, such outcomes depend on a range 
of variables including the expectations of citizens, norms of fairness and justice and the nature of 
the service itself (McCloughlin 2015). Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the process 
through which services are delivered may be at least as important as, if not more important than, 
service outcomes in building state legitimacy (see also section on “Supporting grievance 
mechanisms” below).  
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The role of intermediaries 
Where traditions of self-organization are weak, and freedom of association is limited, the role of 
intermediaries is crucial to facilitate two-way communication and bridge cultural and power gaps 
(Fox 2014; Grandvoinnet 2015). Effective intermediaries need to be able to forge shared 
agendas in a deeply divided society, develop social bonds cutting across identity groups, and 
create and reinforce a sense of citizenship. In conflict situations, such intermediaries may be 
targeted specifically because of their ability to encourage or generate collective action. Research 
suggests, however, that the experience of conflict can also result in political and social 
empowerment, enabling some community members to act as effective mobilizers (Grandvoinnet 
et al 2015).  
Civil society organizations, traditional organizations, and media institutions often serve as 
mobilizers for TAIs, but in fragile and conflict-affected settings, it is essential to analyse social 
networks carefully to identify legitimate intermediaries above and beyond their technical 
capacities to mobilize citizens (Grandvoinnet et al 2015). In post-war societies, CSOs or 
community-based groups who served the public good before and throughout the war may be well 
placed to build and train networks of change agents, with careful consideration of political and 
economic incentives (Schouten 2011). Local organizations and community-based organizations 
are, by necessity, particularly strong in some fragile contexts and can play an important role in 
strengthening cultures of citizenship. Traditional and customary institutions can serve as 
alternatives to CSOs and can potentially be used to anchor TAIs. However, the reliance on 
traditional institutions has its limitations. First, in some cases, these institutions may lack 
legitimacy, and they may not be fully representative of society. Second, reliance on traditional 
institutions may perpetuate existing patterns of exclusion and reinforce a strong in-group identity, 
while harming bridging ties. Third, reliance on traditional institutions may lead to widespread 
distrust of initiatives aimed at strengthening the role of the state (Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
Furthermore, it is also critical to recognise that civil society – far from being a homogeneous and 
neutral actor in society–state relations – is not always the most influential channel for reform 
processes (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008). The risk that CSO intermediation can intercept 
accountability relationships which link citizens directly to the state needs careful consideration. 
Nevertheless, one study found that when an aid agency strengthens local CSOs and 
intermediary organisations to promote accountability in ways that actively seek partnership with 
and involvement of the local-level state, the intermediary works as a bridge, helping to construct 
an interface between the local level state and citizens, rather than taking the place of the state 
(McGee and Kroesschell 2013). This was found to be the case in a number of donor-led 
interventions in Bangladesh, Mozambique and Nepal (see country examples below). 
Inclusion of local power-holders 
In a context where the poor depend on elites for services, protection and connections, there is a 
risk of elite capture of the benefits of public services and aid investments and the spaces for 
participation. Elites often show rent-seeking behaviour, capturing gains in terms of skill 
development and connections to CSOs and international agencies, at the expense poorer and 
more marginalised members of the community. However, while elites can and do use these 
social political and economic assets in their own interest, they can also use them for the greater 
benefit of the community (see Bangladesh case below). The inclusion of the local elite in TAIs is 
relatively easy for local government officials and CSOs, whereas the inclusion of the poor and 
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marginalised is difficult, especially if they themselves believe that they do not have the capacities 
to be involved in local governance processes. McGee and Kroesschell (2013) suggest that there 
is therefore a need to work with the elite and support them to include the poor, i.e. ‘co-opt the 
elite’ or ‘capture the elite’, while challenging their individual power. 
The power of information and informal networks 
Accessing, (re-)producing and disseminating accurate and neutral information essential for 
rebuilding trust between citizens and the state is particularly challenging in fragile and conflict-
affected settings. TAIs may enable the (re)building of an ´information ecosystem´ that 
emphasizes inclusive information flows that reach all groups within society, as long as this is 
handled in sensitive and transparent ways. Transparency, both in terms of production and 
dissemination of information, is essential for legitimacy and to enable citizens to have an 
understanding of how decisions are reached. But this transparency needs to be managed 
carefully to avoid perceptions of elite capture or favouritism toward particular individuals or 
groups. Information must be disseminated as widely as possible to all groups in society. To do 
so, knowing the different media on which citizens rely for information is essential, as is 
disseminating information in different formats to reach different audiences (Grandvoinnet et al. 
2015). 
Equally important is to recognise the role of informal networks and relationships in how 
information is shaped. In certain cases, rumours and informal information may be more trusted 
than that emanating from official sources. Thus, findings from TAIs may have more traction if 
they are conveyed informally. The dominance of the informal has important implications for how 
TAIs may be structured and measured, and how they might have most impact (Joshi, email 
communication 3 April 2017).  
Balancing incentives and sanctions 
Consideration needs to be given to the relative weight given to sanctions when implementing 
TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings. An emphasis on consequences (sanctions, redress, 
compensation) can change the mix of perceived incentives that influence behaviour, yet in many 
fragile and conflict-affected settings pro-accountability actors with very limited political space and 
resources often face stark trade-offs in terms of their relative emphasis on incentives vs 
sanctions. The political dynamics of these possible trade-offs between forward and backward-
looking accountability efforts – and between more collaborative vs more confrontational 
approaches – have rarely been explicitly addressed in the research literature on TAIs. Yet those 
promoting accountability in fragile and conflict-affected settings are likely to be quite strategic 
about investing their limited political capital primarily in forward- looking, preventative approaches 
(Fox 2014).         
Supporting grievance mechanisms 
One study found that the existence of grievance mechanisms and complaints procedures within 
public services is significantly related to more positive perceptions of the government (Mallet el al 
2015), which can help to strengthen the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens. The study 
suggests that actually using the grievance mechanisms does not appear to be a necessary 
condition for this relationship to hold; their simple presence seems to matter in and of itself. The 
study also finds a strong correlation between levels of civic participation vis-à-vis service delivery 
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and perceptions of the government: when respondents attended a community meeting about 
services (or knew of such a meeting), or when they were consulted about services in their 
community, they were more likely to think better of the government. These findings suggest that 
allowing citizens to ‘see’ their system of government at work in a tangible manner appears to 
influence the way people think about their state. Thus, promoting state legitimacy may perhaps 
be less about the quality of services themselves, and more about the kinds of mechanisms that 
promote engagement and exchange between citizens and the state (Mallet el al 2015). 
5. Selected country examples2  
Evidence of the impact of TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings is particularly limited and 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, some empirical studies document the positive impact that TAIs have 
had on various aspects of the state-society relationship in such contexts. While not all the 
interventions presented below have greater social accountability as their explicit goal, they do 
aim to promote interaction among citizens in one way or another, and can therefore be 
considered relevant here. A note of caution is that, as discussed above, the intended outcomes 
(and interaction between outcomes) expected to be delivered by such interventions needs 
particularly careful consideration in fragile and conflict-affected settings: 
Bangladesh 
The Sharique Programme in Bangladesh is a local governance programme that aims to 
empower local citizens through more democratic, transparent, inclusive and effective local 
government systems. A study of the programme (cited in McGee and Kroesschell 2013) shows 
the importance of invisible power relations shaped by gender, education, wealth, family ties and 
political relations in the interaction between local government institutions and citizens. Local 
elites have emerged as central actors in this relationship, acting as intermediaries and 
sometimes even attending to basic needs in the absence of government services. This study has 
shown that the Sharique programme's ward platforms have been able to include the local elites 
in spaces where they then debate public affairs jointly with other members of the community, 
including the concerns and needs of poorer community members. However, the study also 
shows that there is still a risk of elite capture within these ward platforms.  
                                                 
2 In addition to the examples below, a number of systematic reviews of social accountability interventions in 
service delivery have been conducted over recent years (especially in the health and education sectors). 
However, none of these focus specifically on fragile settings, and hence have not been summarised here, 
although some do address the importance of context in understanding the effectiveness and impact of such 
interventions: Enhancing community accountability, empowerment and education outcomes in low and 
middle-income countries: A realist review (2014); What is the evidence that the establishment or use of 
community accountability mechanisms and processes improves inclusive service delivery by governments, 
donors and NGOs to communities? (2013); Social Accountability: What are the Lessons for Improving Family 
Planning and Reproductive Health Programs? (2014); Community monitoring interventions to curb corruption 
and increase access and quality of service delivery in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review 
(2016);  Health provider responsiveness to social accountability initiatives in low- and middle-income 
countries: a realist review (2016)  
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Cambodia  
The World Bank financed Cambodia Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) project is an 
example of a social accountability intervention with trust-building at its core. The project aims to 
increase the extent and ability of citizens, CSOs, and other non-state actors to hold the state 
accountable and make it responsive to their needs, while simultaneously working with state 
institutions to enhance the capacity of the state to become transparent, accountable, and 
participatory. Critically, over time the DFGG project has built a relationship that has enabled 
ongoing negotiations regarding the government’s social accountability policy and the 
establishment of a joint social accountability steering committee, in which civil society and 
government sit together. In one province, beneficiary monitoring of the district administration 
benefited from a hybrid approach of the lead CSO first supporting the district administration and 
later holding it to account via citizen monitoring. This sequencing worked in the context of 
Cambodia where levels of mistrust are high. CSOs needed to first build trust with the district 
administration before they could successfully carry out third party monitoring. The approach has 
resulted in improved performance of public officials and some sanctions being put in place, and 
is now being rolled out across the project (cited in Carter 2013). 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Tuungane, a major UK government funded Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) Program 
implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE International in Eastern 
DRC, has been working since 2007 in 1,250 war-affected villages with a targeted beneficiary 
population of approximately 1,780,000 people. Over this period Tuungane organized the election 
of village committees, and training in leadership, good governance, and social inclusion. The 
elected committees then worked with populations to select development projects and oversee 
the implementation of these projects.  
According to an evaluation of the programme (Humphreys et al 2012), target populations 
reported very high levels both of exposure to project activities and of satisfaction with the 
outcomes of the project.  However, in terms of impact, on most measures there was no evidence 
that these positive experiences led to behavioural changes. In general, governance outcomes 
were relatively strong in both control and treatment areas (e.g. electoral procedures, 
transparency, leakage). There was evidence that in Tuungane areas, communities included more 
women on committees to manage funds, but the substantive effect was weak. There was also 
evidence that citizens in Tuungane areas were more likely to complain when funds were misused 
by leaders, suggesting some fostering of bottom up accountability. And there was some weak 
positive evidence for improvements in trust (particularly trust in ex-combatants, which is generally 
low), but no effects for other measures of within or between village cohesion.  
The evaluation speculates that weak effects on governance outcomes may have resulted from 
the fact that existing structures were resilient and that, while behaviour may have changed 
temporarily to meet the conditions of development actors, more fundamental change was not 
being achieved. Other possibilities were that the scale of the project was too small or that the 
programme was pitched at the wrong level to effect change in governance structures and social 
cohesion (Humphreys et al 2012).  
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Iraq  
A local governance programme in Iraq provided assistance to build the technical skills and 
capacity of local councils in order to win the trust of citizens and give them legitimacy. Following 
the initial cessation of hostilities in the country, the programme supported the creation of these 
councils and helped them to interact with citizens in meaningful ways. The councils conducted 
assessments of service needs, participated in joint planning exercises with local government 
departments, voiced citizens’ concerns, and sought to hold officials accountable. One evaluation 
of the programme found that capacity building succeeded in several ways: the programme gave 
the councils legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents, participatory processes helped to ensure 
that membership on the councils was representative and minimized the risk of elite capture, and 
the formation of the councils led to increased trust among citizens. However, the evaluation 
cautioned that these gains could be lost wherever conflict continued, the legacy of government 
oppression remained strong, and the central government opposed decentralization (cited in 
Grandvoinnet et al 2015). 
Liberia 
An evaluation of a DFID‐ funded community‐ driven reconstruction (CDR) programme 
implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in post‐ conflict northern Liberia, 
which aimed to improve material well‐ being, reinforce democratic political attitudes, and 
increase social cohesion, found strong evidence that the programme was successful in 
increasing social cohesion, some evidence that it reinforced democratic political attitudes and 
increased confidence in local decision making procedures, but only weak evidence that material 
well‐ being was positively affected. There was no evidence of adverse effects (Fearon et al 
2008). 
Mozambique 
A study of the the Governance, Water and Sanitation Programme (PROGOAS) in Mozambique 
examined how public and social accountability can be promoted in terms of institutional capacity 
and legitimacy. Specifically, it looked at the constraints and opportunities encountered by 
“conselhos consultivos”, a recent and promising participatory institution in the country. The study 
concluded that PROGOAS was able advance public accountability at the local level, especially 
when different approaches, such as capacity building, radio programmes and local governance 
self-assessments, were combined and developed. However, public accountability is also 
influenced by other endogenous variables of local governance, such as functionality, 
representation, participation in decision making and power relations, which can be addressed 
only partially by programme activities.  
Moreover, no evidence was found that an external actor such as PROGOAS can contribute in 
the short run to the emergence of sustainable initiatives that manifest themselves through 
“conselhos consultivos”. The programme can lay the foundations for local accountability, 
especially through capacity development and dissemination of information, but local civil society 
is still too fragmented, weak and aid dependent to play an autonomous role. The authors 
conclude that it is therefore likely that citizens will create new political spaces and adopt new 
forms of power only as a result of increasing decentralisation, public accountability and local 
development (Faehndrich and Nhantumbo 2013). 
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Nepal 
A study of public audits in Nepal found that while the initiative was successful in creating a space 
for all citizens and stakeholders to openly discuss issues of concern with regard to the 
implementation of local infrastructure projects, accountability from the state to its citizens was 
hindered by the absence of locally elected bodies and the top down appointment of officials. In 
practice this meant that officials prioritised upward accountability, and corruption remained a 
problem, suggesting that some form of democratic process is essential for TAIs to be effective. 
The study concludes that although public audits contribute to unravelling corruption in some 
cases, public accountability in Nepal remains weak and public audit can only have a limited 
impact because it is confined to particular projects with short term timelines. Unless it is in the 
interest of government officials to gain the trust and confidence of citizens, accountability remains 
rhetoric, public services weak, and the state fragile (cited McGee and Kroesschell 2013). 
6. Possible areas for future research 
In order to strengthen the evidence base on the contextual dimensions of TAIs, numerous 
commentators have suggested promising areas for future research. While few of these relate 
specifically to fragile and conflict-affected settings, they do hold relevance in so far as they focus 
on the need to consider more carefully the kinds of political complexities and constraints which 
are a common feature of fragile and conflict-affected settings.  
▪ Applying different research methods: Piloting new approaches to impact assessment 
using mixed methods to understand non-linear change and complexity (McGee and 
Gaventa 2010; Bukenya et al 2012), including the use of a polity-based theory of change 
which views social accountability as part of an historical process through which state and 
non-state actors forge social contracts around particular public goods over time (Joshi & 
Houtzager, 2012); Adopting a “causal chain” lens to unpack the dynamics of change that 
involve multiple actors and stages (Fox 2014). Existing initiatives could be assessed for 
the extent to which they travelled along the causal chain and where the roadblocks to 
impact lay, to inform the development of new TAIs. (Joshi 2014). 
▪ Conducting more comparative research: Conducting more comparative in-depth work 
across contexts and initiatives (McGee and Gaventa 2010), to explore whether initiatives 
can travel across context, method and issue (McGee and Gaventa 2010) with a greater 
focus on durability and scalability of different kinds of initiatives (Joshi 2013); Identifying 
certain typlogies of context, within which there are different possibilities for the effective 
implementation and success of different types of TAIs (Bukenya et AL 2012). 
▪ Exploring incentives: Analysing incentives for collective action on transparency and 
accountability with an explicit focus on power and politics, exploring issues such as why 
citizen groups engage in social accountability in some settings and not others, over some 
issues and not others, or at some points in time and not others, as well as what drives 
public officials and politicians to respond in some contexts and not others.  (McGee and 
Gaventa 2010; Joshi 2013). 
▪ Understanding coalitions: Building new knowledge on how to build cross-cutting 
accountability coalitions that link civil society actors, media, champions inside 
government, researchers and others (McGee and Gaventa 2010). 
▪ Understanding global-local linkages: Exploring the interaction of global, national and 
local governance and gaining a better understanding of how TAIs fare when they target a 
diverse set of non-state actors, including from the private sector, both at the global and 
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national level (especially in sectors such as extractive industries) (McGee and Gaventa 
2010; Joshi 2013); Examining the ways in which external actors, especially aid donors 
influence TAIs (Gaventa, email communication) 
▪ Understanding the role of new technologies: Exploring the consequences of the latest 
generations of digital technologies (social media, internet access in remote areas, mobile 
telecoms) for political action (Gaventa, email communication). 
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